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ABSTRACT
Background: Accomplishing infection prevention and
control (IPC) in health facilities in Sub-Saharan Africa
is challenging. Owing to poor IPC, healthcare workers
(HCWs) were frequently infected during Sierra Leone’s
Ebola epidemic. In late 2014, IPC was rapidly and
nationally scaled up. We carried out workshops in
sampled facilities to further improve adherence to IPC.
We investigated HCW experiences and observed
practice gaps, before and after the workshops.
Methods: We conducted an uncontrolled, before and
after, mixed-methods study in eight health facilities in
Bo and Kenema Districts during December 2014 and
January 2015. Quantitative methods administered to
HCWs at baseline and follow-up included a survey on
attitudes and self-efficacy towards IPC, and structured
observations of behaviours. The intervention involved a
workshop for HCWs to develop improvement plans for
their facility. We analysed the changes between rounds
in survey responses and behaviours. We used
interviews to explore attitudes and self-efficacy
throughout the study period.
Results: HCWs described IPC as ‘life-saving’ and
personal protective equipment (PPE) as uncomfortable
for providers and frightening for patients. At baseline,
self-efficacy was high (median=4/strongly agree).
Responses reflecting unfavourable attitudes were low
for glove use (median=1/strongly disagree, IQR, 1–2)
and PPE use with ill family members (median=1, IQR,
1–2), and mixed for PPE use with ill HCWs (median=2/
disagree, IQR, 1–4). Observations demonstrated
consistent glove reuse and poor HCW handwashing.
The maintenance of distance (RR 1.09, 95% CI 1.02 to
1.16) and patient handwashing (RR 1.19, 95% CI 1.3
to 1.25) improved to >90%.
Conclusions: We found favourable attitudes towards
IPC and gaps in practice. Risk perceptions of HCWs
and tendencies to ration PPE where chronic supply
chain issues normally lead to PPE stock-outs may
affect practice. As Sierra Leone’s Ebola Recovery
Strategy aims to make all facilities IPC compliant,
socio-behavioural improvements and a secure supply
chain are essential.
INTRODUCTION
Sierra Leone was profoundly impacted by
the Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic in
West Africa, documenting 14 122 cases and
3955 deaths.1 Its ﬁrst conﬁrmed case in May
Key questions
What is already known about this topic?
▸ A gross lack of adequate infection prevention
and control (IPC) practice in health facilities was
a main driver of the Ebola virus disease (EVD)
epidemic in Sierra Leone.
▸ Given the rarity of these epidemics, it is likely
that IPC strategies are not frequently documen-
ted in the scientific literature and have not
undergone formal evaluation in situ.
What are the new findings?
▸ We comprehensively evaluate attitudes and self-
efficacy towards IPC, and adherence to practice
using the appropriate combination of qualitative,
quantitative, observational and participatory
approaches.
▸ The study was carried out during the height of
the national epidemic, thereby presenting a
unique opportunity to examine actual healthcare
worker behaviours and attitudes under duress,
and also to inform policy and practice.
Recommendations for policy
▸ Sierra Leone’s National Recovery Plan for
2015–2017 has put US$33 million towards
scaling up and maintaining IPC across all
healthcare facilities in order to prevent a recur-
rence of EVD.
▸ The practice gaps identified provide the rationale
to improve current training packages by provid-
ing insight into contextual, emotional, psycho-
logical and behavioural factors that influence
adherence to IPC practice and the motivations of
healthcare workers.
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2014 led to the initial outbreak in the eastern districts of
Kailahun and Kenema. From June to December, trans-
mission spread to all districts and peaked at 600 con-
ﬁrmed cases weekly.2 The incidence among healthcare
workers (HCWs) became 100 times that of the general
population, leading to the deaths of nearly 10% of the
workforce.3 4
Poor infection prevention and control (IPC) serves as
an efﬁcient ampliﬁer of transmission of viral haemor-
rhagic fevers (VHF).5–7 In primary healthcare facilities,
also called peripheral health units (PHUs), HCWs lacked
the supplies and training to apply rigorous symptom
screening and IPC practices recommended for Ebola
treatment units (ETU).8 Such deﬁcits increased the risk
of occupational and nosocomial infection for HCWs and
non-EVD patients, respectively. The majority (66%) of
HCW infections occurred in PHUs and hospitals.4 As
HCWs became infected, colleagues became frightened
and demoralised, and the community’s trust of the health
system was further eroded.9
By August, grossly insufﬁcient IPC led to the infection
of 43 HCWs in Kenema district, mainly in Kenema
Government Hospital, which had become a de facto
ETU.3 10 To prevent EVD transmission in PHUs, the
International Rescue Committee (IRC), WHO and
Kenema’s District Health Management Team provided
IPC supplies including light personal protective equip-
ment (PPE), and training to Kenema’s PHUs near the
peak of the district’s outbreak in August 2014. The train-
ing covered screening, isolation, referral, hand hygiene,
use of light PPE, sharps management, environmental
cleaning and waste disposal.11 12 The epidemic contin-
ued to spread rapidly and geographically. Nearly all
PHUs remained open, albeit with substantially
reduced stafﬁng and services.13 A rapid assessment of
PHUs in six districts found deﬁciencies in the identiﬁ-
cation and isolation of suspected cases, scarcity of sup-
plies (PPE, chlorine, water and incinerators) and
delays in referral of suspected cases to ETUs.14 This
led the Ministry of Health and Sanitation, the IRC-led
Ebola Response Consortium, UNICEF and the US
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to
train HCWs in IPC in all 1180 PHUs across 14 districts
nationally, between October and December 2014.12 15
The effort was paired with a quality assurance pro-
gramme to monitor inventory, structures and practices
on an ongoing basis. To learn from this experience
and evaluate attitudes, experiences and the effects of
an improvement workshop on behaviours, we con-
ducted a mixed-methods study with multiple objec-
tives. The primary objective was to generate insights
into how IPC behaviours can be improved in a short
time frame during an EVD outbreak. A secondary
objective was to assess HCW attitudes, self-efﬁcacy and
experiences with IPC practice. Another secondary
objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of participa-
tory workshops to develop improvement plans,
through the measurement of changes in adherence to
IPC protocols. The primary outcome measures of
effectiveness were the proportion of correct IPC beha-
viours within the domains of prescreening, donning,
screening, dofﬁng and consultation.
METHODS
Study design, setting and participants
Using a participatory action framework and a mixed-
methods approach, we conducted a single group, pretest
post-test study (also called an uncontrolled before and
after intervention study) in Bo and Kenema districts in
December 2014 and January 2015.16 17 The districts
were at different phases of the epidemic. In Kenema,
the epidemic had peaked, and by December, there were
fewer than two cases per week. Bo’s ﬁrst cases were
reported in July 2014, and by December, transmission
dropped from 20 to 40 cases to 10 cases per week. The
national IPC trainings led by the Ministry of Health and
Sanitation and the Ebola Response Consortium were
completed ∼1 week before the data collection for this
study began in December 2014.
There were two phases of the study where data were
collected: a baseline period (10–20 December 2014)
and a follow-up period 3 weeks later (7–16 January
2015). The study’s intervention consisted of a participa-
tory workshop in each district immediately following the
baseline period and attended by HCWs, district health
ofﬁcials, community health ofﬁcers (CHOs, who are
main healthcare provider at the PHU level) and commu-
nity representatives. At this workshop, participants
reviewed baseline data on IPC practices, attitudes and
risk perception, and they developed improvement plans
for each PHU. At baseline and follow-up, we conducted
self-administered surveys with HCWs exposed to the
intervention and who were present at the PHUs to assess
demographics, attitudes and self-efﬁcacy towards IPC.
Also, at baseline and follow-up, we measured HCW’s
adherence to IPC protocols using structured observa-
tions of patient encounters. During both periods,
in-depth interviews (IDIs) were conducted to explore
attitudes and self-efﬁcacy towards IPC, and experiences
with IPC (without attempts to compare periods). This
included vignettes where HCWs were asked how they
would act in three situations related to IPC in their pro-
fessional and personal lives.
We used stratiﬁed random sampling to select PHUs
from a sampling frame of 121 PHUs in Kenema district
and of 110 PHUs in Bo district. We stratiﬁed by urban/
rural setting and any/no suspected cases at the PHU
level, to maximise variation. One facility was randomly
chosen from each stratum in each district resulting in a
total of eight participating PHUs. At least four HCWs
across a range of roles were included in the IDIs at each
facility as most facilities had no more than four staff.
This formed the purposive sample for the survey.
Sample sizes for the observations were not calculated a
priori due to the fact that observers could be present in
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PHUs for a limited time period and therefore could
capture a limited number of observations. A timeline of
the methods is presented in ﬁgure 1.
Data collection and measurement
Two observers and eight qualitative interviewers per dis-
trict were trained for 2 and 3 days, respectively. Three
co-investigators trained the interviewers and supervised
data collection (LSH, RA and HB). Research tools were
piloted in PHUs that were not selected for study. The
survey was self-administered to the HCWs available on
that day. For the structured observations, teams of two
observers watched HCW–patient encounters for 5 hours
on a single day at each PHU. Behaviours were recorded
for each domain in the national protocol (patient
screening, donning and dofﬁng of PPE, patient consult-
ation, isolation of patients screened positive, donning
and dofﬁng of PPE for isolation, and dead body man-
agement).11 Data were collected with smartphones using
Magpi software (Datadyne, Washington, DC, USA). If a
behaviour was clearly a hazard (ie, HCW attempts to
touch the patient without gloves), observers were
instructed to intervene. IDIs were conducted in Krio
and Mende by one supervisor and three interviewers per
district, digitally recorded and typed verbatim in Krio or
Mende. They lasted for 30–60 min. The transcripts were
translated from Krio and Mende to English.
Data analysis
Data were analysed and interpreted concurrently using a
convergent-parallel design to integrate ﬁndings across
methods.18 Quantitative analysis of the survey and struc-
tured observations was conducted using Stata V.14
(StataCorp LP, College Station, Texas, USA). For the
survey, responses on a four-point Likert item scale were
summarised using the median and the IQR. Since
HCWs were selected based on their availability, some
HCWs may have changed between rounds. Since pairing
was not possible, distributions of responses at baseline
and at follow-up were compared using the Wilcoxon
rank-sum test. For the structured observations, the pro-
portion of correct behaviours for each task and the
changes between rounds were computed. The main
exposure and outcome were the time period (baseline
vs follow-up) and the proportion of correct behaviours,
respectively. A log-binomial model was used to estimate
risk ratios (RR) for each correct behaviour at baseline
and follow-up. Generalised estimating equations (GEE)
with robust SEs accounted for repeated measures among
HCWs and clustering within PHUs.19 An exchangeable
working correlation structure was assumed. For all statis-
tical tests, a signiﬁcance level of p<0.05 was chosen. For
the qualitative components, an initial phase of inductive
coding on a selection of rich, diverse and representative
transcripts was performed based in part on Grounded
theory.20 Coding and analysis were conducted using
Dedoose 5.011 (SocioCultural Research Consultants,
LLC, Los Angeles, California, USA).
Ethics
The study received ethics approval from Durham
University’s Institutional Review Board and the Sierra
Leone Ethics and Scientiﬁc Research Committee. HCWs
provided written informed consent. If any potentially
hazardous behaviours were observed, observers were
required to intervene immediately through a verbal noti-
ﬁcation to the HCW.
RESULTS
The survey was administered to 35 HCWs at baseline
and 33 HCWs at follow-up in 8 PHUs (table 1).
Twenty-two (63%) of the 35 HCWs were the same
between rounds, based on profession, age and sex.
There were no conﬁrmed cases among HCWs in the
sampled PHUs during the study period. Participants
included CHOs, community health nurses (CHNs),
maternal child health aides (MCHAs) and community
health assistants (CHA). Half were below 40 years of age,
and half were women. The majority (77%) were trained
through the national IPC training, and 43% had already
screened patients. In total, 54 IDIs were analysed. Three
recordings were lost, but saturation had been reached
before completion of the available transcripts. All ﬁeld
notes were reviewed to ensure no new themes emerged.
Implementation of the workshop intervention
Each district conducted a daylong workshop. HCWs,
health authorities and community members identiﬁed
key themes in the data. They developed causal diagrams
and matrices, to link IPC challenges to potential solu-
tions, and improvement plans for each PHU that aimed
to improve IPC within 3 weeks (table 2). Solutions
ranged from speciﬁc and attainable (eg, obtaining PPE
for safe deliveries) to broad and more distal (eg, improv-
ing the water supply). Owing to the competing priorities
Figure 1 Timeline of the methods.
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of the emergency response, improvement plans were not
always completed within 3 weeks.
Risk perception, attitudes and self-efficacy
Survey results did not change signiﬁcantly between
rounds; we report the baseline results in the text and
the full results in table 3. Respondents believed that
they had an increased risk of infection compared to
the public (median=4 (strongly agree), IQR, 3–4).
There was slight disagreement with the false statement
that children posed a lesser risk of transmission as
adults (median=2 (disagree), IQR, 2–3). HCWs
described difﬁculty in recognising how the risks of
infection for EVD and other diseases differed. As EVD
was described as an epidemic, ‘it would not last for
long and that maybe after one or 2 months it will all be
over and gone’ (Female state enrolled nurse, Bo).
When asked if they would avoid the use of gloves to
treat ‘non-Ebola’ patients and PPE to treat family
members for any condition, HCWs indicated strong dis-
agreement with these statements (median=1 (strongly
disagree), IQR, 1–2).
HCWs described PPE as uncomfortable, hot and
causing sweating and itching, yet at the same time, ‘pre-
cious, lifesaving, necessary for protecting oneself and
one’s family’. On balance, “it’s better that you overheat
but are protected than that you get fresh air and
become contaminated. I choose to be hot but pro-
tected” (Female CHO, Bo). A recurrent theme was that
HCWs regretted the physical distance with their patients
caused by PPE. There was disagreement among HCWs
regarding the statement, ‘it would be cruel to use PPE
when treating a sick colleague’ (median=2 (disagree),
IQR, 1–4) (table 3). However, a vignette to elicit per-
spectives on the management of an ill HCW suggested
correct behaviours. HCWs most often reported that they
would tell an infected colleague to isolate herself (‘put
her in observation’, ‘don’t touch her’, ‘tell her not to
touch anybody’) or they would refer her to an ETU
(‘call the emergency line’, ‘get that ambulance to take
her away’, ‘encourage her with kind words while she is
being referred’). While acknowledging that it would be
an upsetting experience (‘she will feel the stigma of the
Ebola, she will be shedding tears, as will we’), most
insisted on isolating or using PPE to treat her: “She is
my colleague and friend and when the Ebola ﬁnishes…I
will apologize to her, but (for now) I will not touch her,
I won’t do it, before all of us die, let one die so that
others can live” (Female MCHA, Kenema).
Most HCWs expressed self-efﬁcacy in identifying cases,
removing PPE, and disinfecting a room after identiﬁca-
tion of a suspected case (see table 3). HCWs described
ﬁve prevailing emotions that inﬂuenced the mainten-
ance of care: disbelief, dread, fear, sadness and deter-
mination. Fear was described with the most depth and
nuance, followed by sadness. Their self-efﬁcacy devel-
oped after a gradual acceptance of the threat and after
receiving training, supplies and undergoing practice.
HCWs described how their own attitude or knowledge
has changed after the training saying, for instance, ‘Now
I feel like I have to be careful in everything I do’
(Female CHN Bo). Several HCWs, particularly those
engaged in childbirth, described discontinuing work at
the outset, but resuming services with conﬁdence once
they received training and PPE stocks:
Let me say the truth, before Ebola, we were working hard
but we were careless in terms of IPC. As for me, the only
time I used to wear gloves was during delivery…the use
of chlorine for hand washing was not common…We had
no idea about the use of wearing of goggles, facemasks,
PPE and gowns…Now with the epidemic of Ebola, hand
washing is widely practiced. (Female MCHA, Kenema)
Most HCWs mentioned that for their IPC to be effect-
ive, community sensitisation was essential. PPE induced
fear among patients, evoking images of burial teams and
‘memories of brothers and sisters taken by Ebola’ and
‘buried by these people’. Sensitisation by HCWs was
reportedly impeded by restrictions on their movement,
Table 1 Characteristics of survey participants, baseline
(N=35)
Characteristic N (%)
Sex, male 14 (40)
Age*
<30 8 (23)
30–39 11 (31)
40–49 11 (31)
50+ 3 (8)
Profession*
CHN 11 (31)
MCHA 9 (26)
CHA 4 (11)
CHO 3 (9)
Community health worker 1 (3)
Endemic disease control unit assistant 1 (3)
Laboratory technician 1 (3)
Other 4 (11)
Workplace
Community health post 17 (49)
Community health centre 16 (46)
Maternal and child health post 2 (6)
District
Bo 16 (46)
Kenema 19 (54)
Trained in national IPC programme* 27 (77)
Screened patients in past 6 months 15 (43)
*Missing data for n=2 (age), n=1 (profession) and n=4 (training).
CHA, community health assistant; CHN, community health nurse;
CHO, community health officer; IPC, infection prevention and
control; MCHA, maternal child health aide.
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inaccessibility of communities, ﬁnances and a resistance
from community members:
They are really been panicked to come…they will stand
at the gate and start to talk to themselves in fear of the
booths that we have constructed. But we are still sensitiz-
ing them to continue coming. (Female MCHA, Kenema)
HCWs tried to counteract patients’ fears by counsel-
ling them individually to understand the rationale
behind the use of PPE:
When the patients come, they sit down. Before we start
our work, we talk to them, “Now, you see me as I am, I
am alright. I am going to dress in order to protect
myself, and protect you. May be I am sick but you are not
aware. I would be talking to you may be the spit from my
mouth jumps to your face or whatsoever or your nose or
your eye being that they are closer to me, if I had the
disease, you will have it. Or in case I am asking you ques-
tions then your child throws up or coughs, I will be
infected. So for this reason I am going to put on these
dressings. Don’t see me and be afraid. I am trying to
protect myself and protect you so that I won’t infect you
and you also will not infect me. (Male MCHA, Bo)
HCWs mentioned three further threats to self-efﬁcacy.
First, HCWs doubted the differential diagnosis for
suspect cases: “typhoid…malaria…Lassa have signs of
Ebola” (Female CHO, Bo). Second, respondents at
follow-up remained concerned about PPE shortages
(median=3 (agree), IQR, 2–3). Third, HCWs empha-
sised that while conducting IPC, they continued to deal
with a disrupted health system:
There is no toilet, no water well, no network coverage,
no means of transportation… these are our problems. …
And you tell a person to wash their hands at the facility,
but this is not easy without water. (HCW, Bo)
Adherence to IPC behaviours
The proportions of correct behaviours and RRs compar-
ing the proportion of correct behaviours between base-
line (90 screenings and 54 consultations) and follow-up
(131 screenings and 32 consultations) are shown in
table 4 (see online supplementary material annexe
(Final annex_ratnayake.pdf) for results stratiﬁed by dis-
trict). No suspected cases or dead bodies were observed;
therefore, all observations relate to the screening of
patients and subsequent consultations. During prescre-
enings, only one instance of HCW handwashing was
observed. The proportion of HCWs asking patients to
wash their hands (RR 1.45, 95% CI 1.16 to 1.8) and
patients doing so on prompting from the HCW (1.49,
1.19 to 1.86) increased. Patient handwashing, with or
without HCW prompting, increased though not signiﬁ-
cantly from 82% to 99% (RR 1.21, 95% CI 0.95 to 1.71).
HCWs frequently mentioned patient handwashing as
straining on the HCW–patient relationship:
When they come and you tell them to wash their hands,
they make comments like, “What about [you], do you
wash your hands every day?”…the concept that behaviour
should be changed, it is not really easy, it is difﬁcult.
(Female CHO, Kenema)
HCWs wore boots and face masks more than 60% of
the time at baseline and more than 80% at follow-up
Table 2 Key IPC challenges and solutions outlined by workshop participants in action plans
Problem Potential solution
Frequency,
n=8 (%)
Lack plan and physical materials for screening booth Build screening materials or booth 7 (88)
Lack plan/materials for deliveries Procure elbow gloves, delivery aprons, etc 4 (50)
No latrines for suspect cases Build a dedicated latrine 4 (50)
Routine care requires contact Obtain an electronic blood pressure machine 4 (50)
Community members do not understand rationale for
IPC
Increase community sensitisation on IPC and
handwashing
3 (38)
Handwashing among staff and patients is poor Reinforce handwashing through signage; increase soap
supply
3 (38)
Lack a working incinerator Build an incinerator or burning pit 3 (38)
Lack an isolation area Build an isolation area 3 (38)
Lack fencing for facility Put in fencing 3 (38)
Water supply is inconsistent Increase the supply of water 3 (38)
Need to reinforce supervision, training or mentorship
for IPC
Implement IPC supervision or peer mentoring 2 (25)
Lack space for women postdelivery Obtain mattresses for postnatal care 2 (25)
Concerned PPE will run out Ensure additional PPE is available 1 (13)
Electricity is inconsistent Address generator problems 1 (13)
Lack safe area for PPE removal Make space for a PPE removal area 1 (13)
HCW, healthcare worker; IPC, infection prevention and control; PPE, personal protective equipment.
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Table 3 Self-efficacy, risk perception and attitudes among HCWs
Overall Bo Kenema
Baseline
35
Follow-up
33
Baseline
16
Follow-up
16
Baseline
19
Follow-up
17
No. of respondents Median* (IQR)
Median
(IQR) p Value†
Median
(IQR)
Median
(IQR)
Median
(IQR)
Median
(IQR)
Self-efficacy
I can correctly identify suspected Ebola cases
using the screening flow chart.
4 (3–4) 3 (3–4) 0.35 4 (3–4) 4 (3–4) 4 (3–4) 4 (3–4)
I can remove PPE after isolating a suspected Ebola case
without infecting myself.
4 (3–4) 3 (3–4) 0.52 4 (3–4) 3 (3–4) 4 (3–4) 3 (3–4)
I can safely disinfect a room where a suspected Ebola case has been
isolated to remove any risk of infection to myself or other.
4 (3–4) 4 (3–4) 0.25 4 (3–4) 4 (3–4) 4 (3–4) 3 (3–4)
There is enough PPE at my facility to protect us from being infected
with Ebola.
4 (3–4) 3 (2–4) 0.21 3 (3–4) 3 (2–4) 4 (3–4) 4 (3–4)
Attitudes and risk perception
I am at higher risk of becoming infected with Ebola because I work in
a health facility.
4 (3–4) 4 (3–4) 0.51 4 (3–4) 4 (3–4) 4 (3–4) 4 (3–4)
I am less likely to become infected with Ebola when taking care of
children than adults.
2 (2–3) 2 (1–3) 0.87 2 (2–3) 2 (2–4) 2 (1–2) 2 (1–3)
If my colleague is sick it would be cruel to use PPE when treating
him/her.
2 (1–4) 1 (1–3) 0.4 2 (1–4) 1 (1–2) 2 (1–4) 2 (1–4)
I do not need to use PPE when taking care of a family member with a
fever, headache, diarrhoea and nausea.
1 (1–2) 1 (1–2) 0.87 1 (1–2) 1 (1–2) 1 (1–4) 1 (1–2)
I do not need to wear gloves when I take care of non-Ebola patients. 1 (1–2) 2 (1–2) 0.29 1 (1–2) 1 (1–2) 2 (1–2) 2 (1–2)
*Responses were given on a four-point Likert item scale from strongly disagree 1 to strongly agree 4.
†Evaluated using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
HCW, healthcare worker; IQR, interquartile range; PPE, personal protective equipment.
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Table 4 Proportions of correct IPC events before and after the workshop
Baseline
n=90
Follow-up
n=131
RR*Correct Per cent Correct Per cent 95% CI
Prescreening
Patient went directly, or HCW-directed patient, to screening area 51 57 31 24 0.53 0.37 to 0.77
Attendant washed hands 1 1 0 0 – –
Screener asked patient to wash hands 56 62 105 80 1.45 1.16 to 1.80
Patient washed hands on direction from HCW 54 60 105 80 1.49 1.19 to 1.86
Patient washed hands directly or washed on direction from HCW 74 82 130 99 1.27 0.95 to 1.71†
Donning
Wore rubber boots or covers 60 67 111 85 1.51 1.14 to 1.99
Wore face shield or mask 69 77 109 83 1.27 1.03 to 1.58
Completed in correct order 3 3 73 56 8.94 0.84 to 95.61
Took off /did not wear jewellery 89 99 114 87 0.83 0.72 to 0.97
Wore new gloves 17 19 40 31 2.56 1.37 to 4.79
Continued to wear gloves 63 70 87 66 0.75 0.6 to 0.94
Screening
No other HCWs were in screening area 86 96 104 79 0.86 0.69 to 1.07†
Stood 1.5 m from patient 82 91 130 99 1.11 0.83 to 1.48†
Sat sideways to patient 21 23 75 57 2.3 1.34 to 3.95
Held digital thermometer 5–6 cm from patient 82 91 15 12 0.23 0.12 to 0.43†
Doffing
Removed any light PPE 13 14 42 32 2.54 1.32 to 4.88
Removed gloves 9 10 29 22 4.09 1.34 to 12.49
Washed gloved or ungloved hands 10 11 25 19 2.58 1.0 to 6.66
Removed face shield or goggles 8 9 2 2 0.21 0.05 to 0.94
Completed in correct order (if removed gloves) 3 3 29 22 6.64 2.09 to 21.14
Baseline
n=54
Follow-up
n=32
Correct Per cent Correct Per cent RR* 95% CI
Consultations
Washed hands before treating patient 8 15 3 10 0.63 0.18 to 2.21
Washed hands after treating patient 21 39 5 16 0.91 0.5 to 1.65
Put on new gloves before treating patient 50 93 29 91 0.97 0.85 to 1.1
Did not remove gloves after treating patient 6 11 8 25 1.51 0.55 to 4.12
Stood 1.5 m from patient 35 65 29 91 1.18 0.92 to 1.51
*Risk ratio using binomial regression (family: binomial, link: log) accounting for clustering at the health facility level (GEE). Hyphens indicate where parameter was not estimable.
†Indicates that a Poisson regression (family: Poisson, link: log) was used due to the failure of the binomial model to converge.
HCW, healthcare worker; IPC, infection prevention and control.
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(boots, RR 1.51, 95% CI 1.14 to 1.99; face masks, RR
1.27, 95% CI 1.03 to 1.58). Donning in the correct
order increased ninefold from baseline (3%) to
follow-up (56%) (RR 8.94, 95% CI 0.84 to 95.61). In
20% of screenings at follow-up, additional HCWs were
present in the screening area (which is not recom-
mended; RR 0.86, 95% CI 0.69 to 1.07). Virtually all
HCWs stood 1.5 m from patients, increasing from 91%
to 99% at follow-up (RR 1.11, 95% CI 0.83 to 1.48).
Twice as many HCWs sat sideways towards patients to
avoid bodily ﬂuids (23% vs 57%, RR 2.3, 95% CI 1.34 to
3.95). There was a marked decrease from 91% to 12%
of HCWs holding thermometers at the recommended
distance of 5–6 cm from patients (RR 0.23, 95% CI 0.12
to 0.43). Across rounds, the temperature check was
applied without questioning for symptoms and risk
factors if afebrile. In no case did a screener ask a patient
about all symptoms and risk factors. HCWs described
questioning as necessary to ‘determine the [epidemio-
logical] link’ for case identiﬁcation. Still, questioning
patients was not viewed as particularly effective because
individuals could ‘deny and hide the (link)’.
Some differences between baseline and follow-up
regarding the dofﬁng procedure were signiﬁcant, includ-
ing removing light PPE and gloves (light PPE, RR 2.54,
95% CI 1.32 to 4.88 and gloves, RR 4.09, 95% CI 1.34 to
12.49) and completion in correct order (RR 6.64, 95%
CI 2.09 to 21.14). Dofﬁng was compromised by the fact
that a low proportion of HCWs removed PPE between
screenings (14% at baseline and 32% at follow-up).
Proportions of glove removal postscreening increased,
but remained low (10% at baseline, 22% at follow-up).
This was accompanied by a lack of handwashing of
gloved or ungloved hands between screenings (11% at
baseline, 19% at follow-up). HCWs expressed concern
about PPE stock-outs, as well as the strain on incinera-
tors that frequent glove and PPE disposal would cause.
Among the 29 HCWs that removed gloves, all completed
dofﬁng in the correct order at follow-up. For consulta-
tions, low proportions of HCWs washed their hands
before treating a patient (15% at baseline, 10% at
follow-up) or after (39% at baseline, 16% at follow-up).
Most HCWs put on a new pair of gloves at baseline
(93%) and follow-up (91%), and a few kept the gloves
on after treating the patient. Most HCWs stayed 1.5 m
from patients (65% at baseline, 91% at follow-up).
DISCUSSION
The EVD epidemic could be considered an overwhelm-
ing emergency in a series of severe epidemics (shigello-
sis and cholera) and endemic diseases (Lassa fever) in
Sierra Leone that have required rigorous IPC.21–23 In
the midst of the emergency response, we studied IPC in
PHUs. This provided an exceptional opportunity to dir-
ectly observe and evaluate adherence to IPC, and to
work with HCWs to improve practice and discuss in
detail the determinants of practice. The conviction
among HCWs that IPC is lifesaving overrides the strong
physical discomfort and distance with patients that it
causes. During workshops, HCWs focused on improving
screening, maintaining physical distance and encour-
aging patient handwashing; changes in these domains
were reﬂected in the improvements seen in these beha-
viours at follow-up. Signiﬁcant improvements were not
consistent across behaviours, partly due to several high
baseline values (>80%). While HCWs also discussed
HCW handwashing, glove changing and the questioning
for symptoms and risk factors, these were poorly
adhered to across rounds.
Our study had important limitations. Uncontrolled
before and after study designs lack a control group, thus
limiting the ability to attribute changes observed to the
intervention.17 Since we had a prior belief that the work-
shop and IPC improvement intervention would be bene-
ﬁcial, we believed that it would be unethical to observe
IPC behaviours without intervening in a control group.
Owing to the need to rapidly implement the study
during a crisis, sample sizes of PHUs were intentionally
small. The results are generalisable only to the PHUs
included in the sample. The delay between the baseline
and follow-up was short, though given the rapid progres-
sion of the epidemic, a study of short-term behaviour
changes was warranted. The lack of pairing of HCWs
between rounds is due to data collection being based on
the availability of HCWs on the day of data collection
rather than an explicit goal to conduct data collection
on days when HCWs could be matched at follow-up.
The implication of this limitation is that we cannot be
sure that the all of those at follow-up were as exposed as
those in the baseline. This likely leads to an underesti-
mation of the intervention’s effect. It is notable that
stafﬁng in PHUs is limited to a small pool of HCWs, and
therefore, 63% of HCWs were the same at baseline and
follow-up. As well, IPC improvement plans targeted
changes at the PHU level, affecting all HCWs, not just
those included in the baseline. There were gaps in fully
implementing and prospectively monitoring the IPC
improvement plans. Instead, we investigated changes in
IPC retrospectively. At least one part of the observation
protocol was apparently not adequately pretested; we
think that the observations of thermometer placement
at follow-up are likely specious. Transmission declined by
December, limiting opportunities to assess IPC for isola-
tion and body management; the number of HCWs
observed was therefore small. Finally, HCWs who were
interviewed may have been more motivated to practise
IPC than those who ﬂed during the peak of the
epidemic.
Nonetheless, the quantitative and qualitative results
were consistent. Attitudes towards IPC were favourable,
but adherence with guidelines was markedly better for
some behaviours than for others. HCWs consistently
wore light PPE despite reporting persistent community
fears. They described their own fear in detail, relating it
to the unprecedented geographic expansion of the
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epidemic and the common experience of losing collea-
gues.9 We interpret this fear as being a driver for some
IPC protocols. It is notable that during VHF outbreaks
in Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo, HCWs
cited community resistance as a major reason for not
wearing PPE in health facilities.5 24 In contrast, PPE use
in this study was high, while glove changing and hand-
washing among HCWs, whether gloved or ungloved,
were poor. This may also reﬂect a gap in knowledge
among HCWs about how putting on or changing gloves
before making contact with patients is necessary to
improve patient safety.25 26 As gloves are fomites, chan-
ging and washing should be universal. HCW practices
may be governed by the rules of rationality in disrupted
health systems under normal circumstances, where
chronic supply chain issues lead to widespread stock-out
of PPE. Another area of uncertainty was the reported
hesitation to use PPE for the management of ill
colleagues. When faced with a real-life situation of an ill
colleague, providers’ emotions may override their knowl-
edge of safe practices, as seen during previous VHF epi-
demics.5 27 This presents an occupational risk for HCWs
who are socially and emotionally challenged by their
social group’s tendency to not use PPE for one of their
own. Overall, as transmission had abated, underlying
emotions and competing priorities may foster a waning
adherence to IPC.
Our ﬁndings reveal difﬁculties with screening proto-
cols in PHUs. Identifying suspect cases before they enter
the PHU is the foundation for IPC in the context of
EVD.8 Across rounds, the protocol was followed incor-
rectly by applying the temperature check without ques-
tioning for symptoms and risk factors if afebrile. As
HCWs cited the importance of establishing epidemiolo-
gic links, one explanation for their insufﬁcient history
taking may be low conﬁdence in the protocol’s
Table 5 Challenges to adherence to IPC in a primary health system
Major challenge
How addressed in
December 2014–January
2015 Potential additional solutions
Communities are unprepared for the
systematic use of IPC and PPE in
PHUs.
HCWs sensitise community
members as they come to
PHU.
▸ Targeted communication campaign in community to
set expectations
▸ Counselling approaches for HCWs to use in
screening and consultation
HCWs may not initially believe in the
high risk of infection.
Training to raise awareness
of risks for HCW infection.
▸ Integrated IPC training in preservice education
curricula
▸ Reinforcement of in-service IPC training in particular
for new staff
▸ Ongoing supportive supervision
Low confidence in the identification of
suspect cases.
Training in screening.
▸ Research on new diagnostic techniques (eg, rapid
diagnostic tests to increase sensitivity of the case
definition and the overall effectiveness of screening)
PPE causes separation in bond
between HCWs and patients.
HCWs found ways to
motivate patients to
recognise them.
▸ Guidance for HCW to increase communication and
bonding with patients
▸ Regular meetings between HCW and health
committee to discuss issues
Discomfort while using light PPE on
a routine basis.
Training in PPE use. ▸ Technical improvements to light PPE
Poor glove changing practices.
Poor handwashing.
Training in PPE use.
Spot checking.
▸ Training that emphasises reasoning for appropriate
use of PPE (including risks of not changing gloves)
▸ Peer systems that emphasise changing of gloves
▸ Monitoring for feelings of high self-efficacy in core
behaviours among groups of HCWs
Fear of PPE stock-out hinders use. Routine stocking of PPE. ▸ Improved supply chain
▸ Training that emphasises reasoning for appropriate
use of PPE
Mixed attitudes towards using PPE
with fellow HCWs.
No specific actions known
by the authors.
▸ Training that specifies HCW treatment scenarios and
addresses doubts
Implementation within a weak and
fractured health system.
IPC treated as emergency
response.
▸ Improved supply chain systems
▸ Improved payment systems for human resources
▸ Improved coverage of functional water and sanitation
infrastructure
HCWs, healthcare workers; IPC, infection prevention and control; PHUs, peripheral health units; PPE, personal protective equipment.
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effectiveness in detecting symptoms and epidemiological
links due to patients’ assumed tendency to hide them.
In PHUs, the majority of patients presenting for vaccin-
ation, antenatal care, and endemic diseases would not
have been infected. Making the differential diagnosis of
a suspect case relies heavily on the WHO case deﬁnition
that speciﬁes symptoms similar to malaria and typhoid.28
The lack of questioning may indicate that HCWs exer-
cise prescreening to judge whether a patient appears
‘well’ or ‘ill’. Patients presenting for routine services in
this study may have appeared well and HCWs may have
given them a cursory temperature check without appro-
priately questioning for risk factors (in the absence of
fever). This reliance on fever may be misguided; a
cohort study of conﬁrmed cases in a holding unit at
Connaught Hospital in Freetown found a reduced sensi-
tivity of the WHO case deﬁnition with 16% of conﬁrmed
cases presenting without fever.29
The development of IPC systems in developing coun-
tries must address several core challenges to health
systems: cost, procurement, a lack of knowledge and
experience with IPC, and other cultural issues.26 In add-
ition, IPC protocols may vary as the evidence base for
some practices is lacking.30 31 It follows that the rapid
scale-up of the Ebola IPC protocol in Sierra Leone has
been a singular challenge. In the wake of the epidemic,
the importance of IPC in primary care settings else-
where in West Africa is gaining recognition through
efforts to systematically address IPC in health facilities
such as the Efﬁciency and Ediﬁcation project in Burkina
Faso, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire.32 Notwithstanding the
structural support and costs covered by Sierra Leone’s
national IPC programme, there are several opportunities
to improve adherence via structural, social and behav-
ioural interventions (table 5).33 First, the Ebola
Response Consortium’s longitudinal postintervention
monitoring of structures, practices and supplies is neces-
sary for identifying improvements needed and maintain-
ing highly specialised supervision for staff and
reiterating the importance of IPC.12 15 Second, training
needs to address more complex determinants of adher-
ence, for example, the dual aims of hand hygiene and
glove changing in addressing different circumstances for
contact with bodily ﬂuids of an Ebola patient for occupa-
tional and nosocomial transmission. Explaining that
gloves must be clean to protect HCWs, and their patients,
is most imperative. Generating positive peer pressure
through participation by colleagues and senior managers
can also be a driver for adherence to hand hygiene.26 34
Using this logic, a group of HCWs’ belief in IPC and
their ability to perform it may be key to achieving consist-
ency. Third, during the foundational training, HCWs
should be engaged early in discussing the care of ill col-
leagues and the need to implement IPC without com-
promise. After an initial training, supportive supervision
could probe and quell any doubts and assure the exhaust-
ive screening of apparently healthy patients.5 Fourth, as
community fears affect self-efﬁcacy, sensitisation on PPE
use in PHUs should be integrated into community
engagement.6 Finally, other areas that we did not address
in our study relate to the improvement of the tools of
IPC which may increase HCW conﬁdence in protocols.
For instance, more research is needed to assess the effect-
iveness of different types of light PPE for healthcare set-
tings31 35 36 and on the use of rapid diagnostic tests for
clinical screening to improve the overall predictive value
of screening for EVD.37–39
As Sierra Leone’s recovery plan intends to make all
PHUs compliant with national IPC protocol, under-
standing how behaviours can be optimised will be para-
mount in achieving this goal.40 EVD’s re-emergence in
Sierra Leone in January 2016 may have led to nosoco-
mial transmission due to the patient’s treatment
seeking at a hospital.41 42 This underlines that the inter-
national community must continue to develop and
support IPC in West Africa, in addition to surveillance
and outbreak response mechanisms, to address future
epidemics.
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